What A Chinese Invasion Of Taiwan Would Look Like

What A Chinese Invasion of Taiwan Would Look Like

By Zeke Cooper - RANE Worldview

The Initial Invasion

Looming over any Chinese calculations of a Taiwan invasion is the United States Indo-Pacific Command, which is composed of approximately 375,000 military and civilian personnel arrayed across the Pacific from Alaska to South Asia, with a notable arc of military alliances and partnerships enclosing nearly the whole of the Chinese coastline. For Beijing, this means speed is of the essence in any Taiwan invasion or military coercion scenario.

2 Basic Options

China has two basic options at the start of a Taiwan invasion: either deter U.S. intervention or pre-emptively disrupt the U.S. ability to respond. The former requires careful timing, an overwhelming capability and ideally political confusion and/or disunity inside the United States. The latter risks instantly escalating the conflict to a full war with the United States, as Japan saw in 1941 following the attack at Pearl Harbor.

While China could hope to disrupt a U.S. response through an unfavorable maritime environment in the South China Sea, it could only be confident in undercutting U.S. capabilities to respond through targeted strikes against key U.S. assets in the region, particularly those in Okinawa and Guam.

Outpace foreign intervention

For Beijing, then, an ideal Taiwan war scenario is a fait accompli. Chinese forces would rapidly overwhelm Taiwanese defenses, deter or delay U.S. intervention, seize key political centers, and force a capitulation by Taiwanese leadership before foreign forces could physically intervene. This is similar to what Russia apparently sought to achieve in its February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, though Moscow clearly miscalculated both the country's will and military capability to fight back, as well as the West's social and political will to rapidly intervene.

The maritime nature of a Taiwan conflict further complicates assessments of how easy it would be for China to do so. On the one hand, an amphibious assault on the island is much more difficult and dangerous than Russia's land invasion of Ukraine. On the other hand, disrupting the resupply of Taiwan by foreign powers is easier given Taiwan's distance and the risks of maritime resupply.

With Taiwan reunification an ever-present goal for Beijing, China seeks to achieve regional military preeminence in order to prevent other (especially Western) powers from countering China's strategic plans. Beijing aims to achieve this by making its military more capable, efficient and technologically advanced to compete as a top-tier force. China's rapid naval expansion is just one case in point. In 1996, the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) comprised 57 ships; by 2019, that number had increased to 335 ships, surpassing the U.S. Navy's 296. In 2022, China led the world in ship production by tonnage.

Massive Amphibious Force Whatever way China chooses to deter or delay U.S. intervention, Beijing needs a massive amphibious force to accomplish its goals in Taiwan. By some assessments, China needs some 600,000 troops to cross the 80-mile-wide Taiwan Strait to ensure victory. Even if we consider a significantly smaller 300,000-person invasion force, the logistics challenges are still significant, and the risks during the crossing are substantial.

China will rely on railways and vehicles to transport the bulk of personnel and materiel from the country's interior to the coast for embarkation. Absent air and naval superiority, Chinese sea points of departure will still be threatened by long-range fire from Taiwanese and supporting Western forces, while ships in transit might be targeted by their subsurface fleet. China will also need to disrupt any Western attempts to reinforce Taiwan with troops or materiel, likely pushing Chinese fleet operations out to key choke points around the periphery of the East and South China seas. While designed to secure the invasion of Taiwan, such actions will significantly disrupt supply chains throughout maritime Asia, risking rapid economic retaliation from abroad and putting global pressure on China to stop its operations.

The greatest threat will come from the fast-attack submarines from the U.S. Pacific Fleet, looking to interdict the transit of high-value targets like Chinese troop transports and support vessels. In contrast to the perceived parity between U.S. and Chinese air forces, China's anti-submarine warfare capabilities have few answers for the fast and quiet subsurface fleet. Even without U.S. intervention, Taiwanese military doctrine emphasizes ''offshore engagement,'' meant to prevent and delay Chinese forces from landing in Taiwan.

All the while, China will want to limit the amount of ordnance it expends on Taiwan — the purpose of a war would be unification, not the destruction of Taiwanese infrastructure and industrial capacity.

Air – Sea Domination

China, then, must assert domination of air and sea space around Taiwan as part of any invasion, both to degrade resistance and to deter U.S. intervention. China has carried out several exercises using commercial roll-on/roll-off ships to test their use in a conflict scenario, but many experts and analysts assess that Beijing still lacks the number of vessels necessary not only for the initial invasion, but for the massive logistical effort necessary to maintain progress. Further, as China has expanded its navy, its focus on bluewater capabilities has seemed to prefer large amphibious ships more suited to distant operations than numerous smaller craft suited for a Taiwan scenario.

“ Even without U.S. intervention, Taiwanese military doctrine emphasizes ''offshore engagement,'' meant to prevent and delay Chinese forces from landing in Taiwan. ”

There are seven key sites in Taiwan that are the most geographically suited for a Chinese landing. But Beijing could look to surprise Taiwanese defenders by concentrating combat power at locations that present natural obstacles for a landing force and thus are likely to be less heavily defended. This would likely come at a high cost of personnel for the Chinese forces and take additional time if the element of surprise is lost — something in short supply for a successful invasion.

Consolidating Gains

Any success in a Chinese invasion of Taiwan will be shortlived if it cannot be sustained. Troops need to be fed, equipment needs to be replaced or refitted and casualties need to be accounted for and evacuated. China's military assesses that 2,100 aircraft and 8,000 ships will be required to support the inflow of fresh troops and supplies and the evacuation of casualties.

In a real-world test of its capabilities, the CPC was able to leverage the Joint Logistic Support Force (JLSF) to provide medical services and build hospitals to support emergency response efforts across the country early in the COVID-19 crisis.

For China, a rapid landing and overwhelming of initial Taiwanese defenses and the establishment of a robust logistics train would be only the start. Taiwan has an active-duty force of 165,000 in addition to 1.7 million reserve personnel. If the Taiwanese are unable to prevent Chinese troops from landing, they will likely resort to urban combat or over time transition to concealed positions in the forested mountains. This is because, despite the manifold capabilities of the Taiwanese defense forces to inflict considerable losses on the Chinese military, they do not have the resources to sustain a defense-in-depth strategy and prevent China from offloading tens of thousands of troops on the island if these Chinese forces are able to gain a foothold.

Hearts and Minds

The optics of a violent occupation of a ''part of China'' will have a deleterious effect on China's international standing and hinder the overall aim of exerting control over Taiwan. The response by Ukraine to Russia's invasion highlights the perils of carrying out an occupation among a militarized civilian population. Winning hearts and minds is central to a successful counterinsurgency operation. However, the violence of action required by the Chinese at the start of an invasion could permanently turn the Taiwanese population against Beijing.

Finally, even if China is capable of deterring U.S. and international involvement, and of overwhelming Taiwan's military and guerrilla defenders, there are still major long-term challenges of occupation, including ensuring stability and figuring out how to use Taiwanese manpower and industrial capacity — not to mention completing political integration.

In 2003, former U.S. Army Chief of Staff Gen. Eric Shinseki told Congress that several hundred thousand troops would be needed to maintain control of Iraq post-invasion. The 1945 allied occupation of Germany and the 1999 NATO deployment to Kosovo occupied their respective areas at a ratio of 1 soldier for every 40 civilians. At that rate, with Taiwan's population at 24 million, China would need 600,000 personnel to secure vital public facilities, critical infrastructure and the population, as well as address the insurgency. This rough estimate also does not account for a protracted, large-scale conflict with America and its allies.

A High-Risk Option

Given 30 years of military modernization, investment and technical advancements, China's People's Liberation Army is assessed by many to be capable of militarily seizing Taiwan, depending on many other outside factors. However, the enterprise would come at a great cost. The integration of joint elements, complex planning and the inherent difficulty associated with amphibious operations have impeded Beijing's ambitions since the 1950s. The close relationship between Taiwan and the United States since the exodus of Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist forces has enabled Taiwan to heavily fortify the island against the threat of invasion. Pledges of support by U.S. administrations and the placement of military installations throughout the western Pacific portend a likely U.S. kinetic reaction to Chinese aggression.

“ Violent incursion into Taiwan would serve to isolate China politically and economically, and would be far from guaranteeing the effective integration of Taiwan into the greater Chinese political, social and economic system. ”

Furthermore, a violent incursion into Taiwan would serve to isolate China politically and economically, and would be far from guaranteeing the effective integration of Taiwan into the greater Chinese political, social and economic system.

By contrast, assuming that Beijing aims to exert de facto political and military control over Taiwan and enable the Chinese military to project combat power beyond the first island chain to establish clear regional military dominance, it retains options short of what would be an incredibly risky invasion. Namely, the employment of gray zone strategies would allow the CCP to continue to pressure Taiwan without necessarily instigating a military reaction from the United States or its allies. Although this strategy has its own perils and shortcomings, compared with an all-out invasion, it may be Beijing's best option.

Zeke Cooper is an Applied Geopolitics Fellow at RANE who has conducted significant research on China-Taiwan relations. : Stratfor Worldview

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